They are still trying to explain the disaster of 1941, or even justify it, by the “suddenness of the enemy attack” and the superiority of the enemy in forces and means. But if this was really the case in the Western and Northwestern directions, then on the southern flank there is no justification for the defeat of our troops. Since the main attack of the Wehrmacht was expected in the south, the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated here, which had an overwhelming numerical superiority, especially in armored vehicles and aviation. The enemy began active operations against the Southern Front only on July 2, so there can be no talk of any “surprise”. Two-thirds of the enemy group advancing here were Romanian units, inferior to the Germans in all respects. And yet, the troops of the Southern Front were driven back hundreds of kilometers from the border - to the Dnieper and Odessa. A NEW book from the bestselling author of “1941: A Missed Strike. Why were the Red Army taken by surprise? and “Agony 1941. Bloody roads of retreat” not only reconstructs in detail, day after day, the course of military operations of the Southern Front, but also answers the most painful and “inconvenient” questions: why did the Red Army yield to the enemy even where the Germans had no tank and motorized divisions, no dive bombers, no air superiority, no first strike advantage; Why was the “invincible and legendary” unable to stop not only the Wehrmacht, but even Hitler’s Romanian allies and “outright” lost the summer campaign of 1941? After all, if there are “pure victories”, there are also “pure defeats” - unforgivable, unjustified, without “good reasons” and “mitigating circumstances”. And the collapse of the Southern Front is just such a case.