1945 was not only the Year of Victory, but also the pinnacle of Soviet military art - in the finals of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army took revenge for all the defeats of 1941–1942, rising to a qualitatively new level of solving combat missions and leaving them far behind as opponents , and allies. “Liberal” revisionist historians are still trying to deny this fact, arguing that the Victory came to us “at too high a price,” that even in the triumphant 1945, the Soviet command was inferior to the German in operational art, being in able only to push back and “squeeze out” the enemy due to colossal numerical superiority, but without having mastered the skills of encirclement operations - the so-called “cannes”, recognized as the highest form of military art. This book refutes all these anti-Soviet myths, showing with specific examples that the notorious “Cannes” by the end of the war became the “calling card” of the Soviet military school, that the Red Army had fully mastered the skill of encircling the enemy, and it was in the grandiose “cauldrons” of 1945 that Hitler’s best forces and last reserves perished.