In the late 1980s and early 1990s, we identified a new Middle Eastern phenomenon called “energy conflicts” and argued that these conflicts were closely linked to the global process of capital accumulation. This article outlines the theoretical framework we have developed over many years and complements our empirical research with recent evidence. We show that the key stylized patterns that we discovered more than twenty years ago, along with other patterns that we have discovered since then, have remained virtually unchanged: 1) conflict in the region remains closely related to the differential profits of the arms-oil coalition, especially oil companies; 2) mainstream capital continues to depend on stagflation, replacing corporate mergers; 3) capitalists now need inflation to offset the specter of debt deflation. The convergence of these interests portends trouble in the Middle East and beyond: All of these groups stand to benefit from rising oil prices, and oil prices rarely, if ever, rise without an energy conflict in the Middle East.