A scholarly bestseller by economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. The authors start from the seemingly simple thesis that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they distribute political power and resources. Thus, democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but elites oppose it. However, a dictatorship is unstable when citizens can pose the threat of social unrest and revolution. In response, when the cost of repression is substantially high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. Through democratization, elites transfer political power to citizens in a credible manner, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy and the form and scope of globalization.