ZapOVO did not have reconnaissance aircraft, and where it was (KOVO, PribOVO) its crews were not prepared for combat operations at night and during the day - in difficult weather conditions. A small part of the reconnaissance aircraft were equipped with aerial cameras. Reconnaissance of the headquarters of special military districts (hereinafter - SMD) could not reliably reveal the groupings of German troops deployed in the initial areas in stripes opposite the districts and did not reveal the exit of mobile formations of German troops to their initial positions for an attack on the USSR , which did not allow the country's leadership and the command of the NPO and OVO to take the necessary measures. The intelligence departments of the OVO headquarters had valuable agents - insignificant and not provided with radio communications. A consequence of the “massive nature” of intelligence was the “clogging” of the intelligence network with insufficiently verified, and often random, individuals. Radio reconnaissance did not ensure the fulfillment of its main function - radio interception - listening and analyzing radio transmissions of the ground forces and the Luftwaffe.