Starting with the disaster in the Baltic states in the summer of 1941 and until the end of 1942, the Red Army lost virtually all the battles on the North-Western Front. Numerous attempts to release Leningrad failed, protracted battles on the Nevsky patch led to colossal losses, and it was never possible to eliminate surrounded by the enemy Demyansk group, the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army ended in the terrible tragedy of Myasny Bor... What was the main reason for these defeats? Difficult conditions of the theater of military operations (in the north-west of the Red Army they had to advance in dense forests and impenetrable swamps)? Constant shortage of ammunition, fuel, food? Or unforgivable miscalculations of the command? In the new book by Valery Abaturov and Miroslav Morozov you will find answers to all these questions.