The main book of the leading naval historian. The most polemical and paradoxical look at the development of the Navy in the 20th century. Refutation of the most common “naval” myths - for example, did you know that, contrary to eyewitness accounts, the Japanese fired less often than the Russians at the Battle of Tsushima, and the greatest losses to the British fleet during the Falklands War were caused by unexploded bombs and missiles? They say that the generals “ always prepare for the last war,” but admirals are no better in this regard - naval tactics in the 20th century constantly lagged behind the scientific and technological revolution. Although the navy is rightfully considered the most high-tech branch of the armed forces and developed much faster than the army and even aviation (it was the sailors who were the first to use such innovations as rapid-fire guns, radars, nuclear power plants and much more), the tactical views of admirals were too often covered with mold, which led to tragic consequences. Most naval battles of the 20th century, upon closer examination, appear to be a tragicomedy of blatant incompetence, unforgivable blunders and absurd miscalculations. But this book is more than a simple “work on mistakes” and analysis of missed opportunities. This is not only a history lesson, but also a forecast for the future.