The book examines the US and NATO intervention in Libya and its consequences for Syria, Iran and the Caucasus. The preparedness of the parties for war is analyzed; US and NATO air operations; strategy and tactics of Gaddafi's army and the GNA rebels; conducting information warfare. Geopolitical, military-technical, economic, financial, energy and environmental aspects of the 2011 Libyan war are explored. Syrian and Iranian troop groups are being considered; Russian military-technical contracts with Syria and Iran; history of the preparation of the “Syrian conspiracy”; the role of the United States in creating an anti-Iraqi coalition (the potential of the United States and Israel); forces, means, capabilities of the Iranian army; Russia's position on a forceful solution to the Syrian and Iranian problems; security issues of Russia and the states of the South Caucasus; strategic lessons from the Libyan war for Russia and the Russian armed forces. The lessons and conclusions of the Libyan war are important not only for its participants, but also for the development of the theory and practice of military affairs in Russia. The book is addressed to orientalists, diplomats and political scientists, military specialists, students and teachers dealing with the problems of international cooperation, as well as reforming the Russian army.